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Abstract
Organizational slack influences various aspects of organizational
phenomena, including managerial coalition building, political behaviors,
risk taking, competitive responses, and profitability. However, prior
research findings on the relationship between organizational slack and
innovation are inconclusive. Building upon prior work on organizational
slack, organizational search, innovation, and agency costs, we propose a
contingency perspective to reconcile the mutually contradictory findings.
First, we argue that influences of organizational slack depend on the type
of innovation considered－whether we consider exploitative innovation or
exploratory innovation. Further, the influences of absorbed slack and
unabsorbed slack are distinct. Contextual characteristics that are closely
associated with particular types of organizational slack－including search
modes, an organization’s degree of selectiveness in their choice of
legitimate slack usage, and the extent to which effective shareholder
monitoring is ensured－condition the ways in which certain types of
innovations are enabled by organizational slack. We also discuss a
complementary relationship between behavioral theory of the firm and
agency theory.
I. Introduction
One of the ironies of business organizations is that efficiency is not necessarily
a recipe of success (Bourgeois, 1981). One good example of why efficiency does
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not necessarily equal success is the concept of organizational slack, which should be
zero at equilibrium according to conventional economic theory (Cyert & March,
1963). However, it is apparent that even very successful organizations maintain
some amount of organizational slack. Organizational slack is a unique class of
organizational resource because managers are allowed considerable discretion in
choosing how organizational slack is used. This managerial discretion is
legitimatized on the premise that organizational slack is not dedicated to specific
purposes of maintaining current operations. Consequently, managers can flexibly
spend organizational slack without sacrificing current performance.
However, the empirical results of works examining whether or not
organizational slack positively influences organizations’ well-being are mixed.
Particularly, prior works’ findings on organizational slack’s influences on risk taking
and innovation are inconclusive at best. Some argue for a positive relationship
(Greve, 2003; Meyer, 1982; Singh, 1986), while others argue for a negative
relationship (Bromiley, 1991; Latham & Braun, 2009; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999;
Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). Further, some scholars argue for a curvilinear
relationship (Geiger, 2002; Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2008; Nohria & Gulati, 1996;
Wiseman & Catanach, 1997). Further, still others deny direct influences of
organizational slack and argue that organizational slack encourages managerial
discretion, no matter in which directions managers exercise their discretion
(Chattopadhyay, Glick, & Huber, 2001; Cheng & Kesner, 1997).
In this manuscript, we propose a contingency perspective to reconcile these
inconclusive research findings－we argue that organizational slack differentially
influences exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation (March, 1991).
Extending prior work on alternative search modes enables us to theorize differential
influences of organizational slack on alternative innovation types. We also argue
that absorbed slack and unabsorbed slack (Singh, 1986) differ in their influences on
innovation by building upon the theory of agency costs (Fama, 1980; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). With these arguments, we attempt to advance the understanding of
organizational slack by emphasizing the need to be explicit on the distinction
between alternative types of organizational slack, as well as between different
innovation types. We also aim to show that agency theory complements behavioral
theory of the firm when we try to explain organizational slack’s influences on
innovation.
II. Inconsistency in Prior Work
The most straightforward and neutral definition of organizational slack may be
the “disparity between the resources available to the organization and the payments
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required to maintain the coalition” (Cyert & March, 1963: 36) of managers. One
reason why organizational slack is a unique class of organizational resource is that
organizational slack influences managerial decisions. For example, it is argued that
organizations with more organizational slack are less likely to make changes in their
technical core because organizational slack buffers organizations from competitive
requirements by absorbing environmental variation (Thompson, 1967). Put
differently, organizations can weather competitive difficulties without drastically
changing themselves because organizational slack allows organizations to maintain
satisfactory performance, even under adverse conditions. Further, given that
organizational slack is a type of resource that is uncommitted to specific purposes, it
enables a substantial degree of managerial discretion, which may or may not be
exercised appropriately. When organizational slack is used appropriately, it can be
characterized as the “cushion of actual or potential resources which allows an
organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to external
pressures for change in policy, as well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect
to the external environment” (Bourgeois, 1981: 30).
Following this positive perspective on organizational slack, organizational
scholars, particularly those of behavioral theory, argue that an enabling relationship
exists between organizational slack and innovation (Greve, 2003; Singh, 1986).
Innovation is an act of creating new values. As such, innovation is often
characterized as uncertain, risky, and resource consuming. Because organizational
slack is not tied to specific operational requirements, managers can experiment with
organizational slack when trying new strategies, organizational structures, and new
products, thereby increasing the likelihood of successful innovation. The assumption
underlying these arguments is that organizational decisions are often an outcome of
political concessions among conflicting managerial coalitions (Cyert & March,
1963). Without uncommitted excess resources, initiatives with uncertain future
consequences would be closely scrutinized by competing managerial coalitions
before approval was given, if any was given at all. Accordingly, one notable
weakness of this argument is that it characterizes organizational decisions as purely
internal processes and ignores the influences of external stakeholders, particularly
shareholders.
On the contrary, agency-theory scholars argue for a competing perspective of
organizational slack. From the perspective of these scholars, organizational slack is
an indication of waste and inefficiency and is associated with less effective resource
usage (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). For example, organizational slack is
often used as a managerial perquisite, including using the slack for unrelated
diversifications, nice offices, or excess payments to managers. From agency
theorists’ perspective, it is problematic when valuable resources are not used for
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productive purposes to increase shareholder value. Even when organizational slack
is used for more productive purposes, agency scholars are concerned that monitoring
whether slack is properly used (or not) may be difficult because organizational slack
is under substantial managerial discretion. As a discretionary resource,
organizational slack may not be controlled by formal internal systems.
Organizational slack may also loosen budget restrictions. Consequently, standard
approaches, including budgeting and auditing, may not be very effective for
ensuring appropriate use of organizational slack. The underlying assumption of these
arguments is that organizational decisions are characterized by the conflict between
managers and shareholders and managers often choose to benefit themselves at the
cost of shareholders unless appropriate monitoring and incentive tools are in place
(Dann & DeAngelo, 1988; Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; Walkling & Long, 1984). Put differently, it is assumed
that managers always try to take advantage of ineffective monitoring by
shareholders, and that shareholders understand how to increase the value of their
firm at least as well as their managers. It may be too simplistic to ignore the effects
of a manager’s professional reputation (which encourages them to be diligent in
increasing shareholder value) (Fama, 1980). Further, the assumption that
shareholders are able to make good managerial judgments may be too optimistic.
However, there are other organizational scholars who empirically show that
organizational slack is negatively associated with risk taking, thereby supporting
agency theory scholars’ perspective on organizational slack (Bromiley, 1991;
Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996).
Given these competing views on organizational slack, some others try to
reconcile them by proposing a curvilinear (or an inverted U-shaped) relationship
between organizational slack and innovation (Geiger, 2002; Kim et al., 2008; Nohria
& Gulati, 1996). They argue that organizational slack enables innovation only until
excessive slack renders organizations too complacent and optimistic to aggressively
pursue risky initiatives including innovation. Once the amount of organizational
slack exceeds a certain threshold, managers grow increasingly reluctant to innovate
as more organizational slack becomes available. The proposed curvilinear
relationship is argued to reconcile “slack-as-resources-for-change and slack-as-a-
buffer arguments” (Cheng & Kesner, 1997: 5), as discussed above. Although it
seems reasonable that we obtain a curvilinear relationship by reconciling
organizational scholars’ and agency-theory scholars’ perspectives, it is not quite
clear why the relationship would be an inverted U-shaped one rather than a U-
shaped one. In fact, there are some scholars who argue for a U-shaped relationship
between organizational slack and risk taking (Wiseman & Catanach, 1997),
suggesting the need for further studies.
Osamu SUZUKI８４
Another approach used to reconcile competing perspectives on organizational
slack is denying the inherent effects of organizational slack; possibly, depending on
the contextual characteristics, organizational slack may differentially influence an
organization’s response to competitive requirements (Cheng & Kesner, 1997).
Alternatively, focus may need to be given to the relationship between organizational
slack and the degree of managerial discretion, discretion that may be either risk-
taking or risk-averse, depending on the degree of environmental threats and
opportunities rather than on behaviors adopted as a consequence of varying degrees
of managerial discretion (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001).
III. Contingency 1: Exploitative Innovation and Exploratory Innovation
In this manuscript, we propose a contingency perspective to reconcile the
mutually contradictory research findings-we consider the possibility that
organizational slack differentially influences distinct types of innovation. We
particularly focus on the differences between exploitative innovation and exploratory
innovation (March, 1991) because the differences between these two types of
innovations are most relevant to our argument. Further, some scholars indicate that
the effects of organizational slack are different for exploitation and exploration
(Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss, 2008).
First, the inconsistent findings from research indicate that organizational slack’s
influences may be different across distinct types of innovation. Specifically, it is
widely understood that when innovating, the choices that might be made in terms of
structural design, degree of process formalization, and organizational culture are
quite distinct depending on whether exploitative innovation and exploratory
innovation is being aimed for (Benner & Tushman, 2002; March, 1991; McGrath,
2001). For example, organizational slack may encourage the adoption of an
organizational structure characterized by large staff function, which may enable
exploitative innovation at the cost of exploratory innovation. Another possibility is
that organizational slack may allow managers to adopt less formalized control
mechanisms, thereby inhibiting exploitative innovation but encouraging exploratory
innovation. In short, the influences of organizational slack on exploitative innovation
and exploratory innovation may not be identical－the influences may even be
completely opposite.
Second, organizational slack may encourage managerial discretion (rather than
directly influence innovation), but the direction in which managers exercise
discretion depends on various factors, including strategy, among others. One of the
most widely agreed upon demarcations of innovation strategy is the one between
mechanistic organization and organic organization (Burns & Stalker, 1961), with the
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former being associated with exploitative innovation and the latter being associated
with exploratory innovation (ibid.). We argue that organizational slack may enable
managerial discretion, which then encourages either exploitative innovation or
exploratory innovation.
In this manuscript, we follow March (1991) and others (Benner & Tushman,
2002; Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996; Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999; Katila & Ahuja,
2002; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Rosenkopf &
Nerkar, 2001; So/ rensen & Stuart, 2000; Sidhu, Commandeur, & Volberda, 2007;
Zhou & Wu, 2010) in defining exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation as
alternative modes of organizational learning. More specifically, we define
exploitative innovation as the use and refinement of existing knowledge in domains
internal to the organization, whereas we define exploratory innovation as the search
and pursuit of new knowledge in domains external to the organization.
1. Organizational Slack and Exploitative Innovation
First, we argue that organizational slack is negatively associated with
exploitative innovation. We make this argument primarily because increases in
organizational slack are associated with being less responsive to competitive changes
and feeling less urgency to solve current performance problems (Litschert &
Bonham, 1978; Yasai-Ardekani, 1986). It is argued that organizations with more
organizational slack may be able to adopt an organizational structure that is
“different from that dictated by contextual variables” (Litschert & Bonham, 1978:
216) because organizational slack can be used to “pay the price” of “a relatively
loose fit between” (ibid.) organizational structure and contextual requirements.
Consequently, when a particular organizational structure is selected, managerial
discretion, or “value of the dominant coalition” (ibid.: 217), plays a more important
role than competitive requirements.
More specifically, with more organizational slack, organizations can absorb the
costs of inappropriate organizational choices in terms of organizational design,
strategic decisions, and operational initiatives. For example, with more recoverable
slack, organizations can reduce their bankruptcy risk, as measured by the downside
risks of return on equity (ROE) (Reuer & Leiblein, 2000), because profit decreases
can be avoided by simply cutting excess costs, or by decreasing organizational
slack. Likewise, organizations with more organizational slack grow less responsive
to competitive requirements when they perform well, because the potential
performance improvements enabled by paying closer attention to competitive
environment looks marginal. Organizational slack may also be accumulated during
times of favorable performance so that excessive upward adjustment of
organizational aspiration may be avoided. Therefore, “slack operates to stabilize the
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system in two ways: (1) by absorbing excess resources, it retards upward adjustment
of aspirations during relatively good times; (2) by providing a pool of emergency
resources, it permits aspirations to be maintained (and achieved) during relatively
bad times” (Cyert & March, 1963: 38).
More formally, organizations can keep their attainment discrepancy (Lant,
1992; Levinthal & March, 1981), or the discrepancy between a performance target
and achieved performance, at a minimum by adjusting realized performance either
by decreasing or by increasing organizational slack. Put differently, organizations
with more organizational slack are associated with having smaller and less frequent
attainment discrepancies. Consequently, an organization’s search for solutions to a
performance problem, or a “problemistic search,” is expected to be less intensive
when more organizational slack is available (Cyert & March, 1963: 80).
Problemistic search, or an organizational search characterized by intentional
efforts to improve current performance, is one of the most important precursors for
finding innovations that closely address performance problems associated with
current knowledge. Accordingly, we argue that innovation targeted at improving or
modifying existing knowledge utilized for current business (henceforth referred to as
exploitative innovation) decreases to the extent that organizational slack increases.
2. Organizational Slack and Exploratory Innovation
On the other hand, we argue that organizational slack is positively associated
with exploratory innovation. As discussed above, organizations with more
organizational slack are less constrained by current competitive requirements in their
strategic as well as operational decisions. Consequently, we argue that organizations
insulated from competitive requirements may decrease their efforts in exploitative
innovation. Conversely, alleviating pressures from current competition actually
enables exploratory innovation (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Cooper & Smith,
1992). As is widely acknowledged, current competitive pressure discourages
organizations’ efforts in exploratory innovation because returns from exploratory
innovation are uncertain and remote, if any returns are gained at all (March, 1991).
Accordingly, organizational slack enables exploratory innovation by buffering
organizations from current competitive environments. In short, the effects of
organizational slack are asymmetrical between exploitative innovation and
exploratory innovation.
More formally, organizational slack allows organizations to satisfice during
searches by lowering the threshold for acceptability (Bourgeois, 1981: 36) so that
“projects that would not necessarily be approved in a tight budget” are indeed
accepted (Cyert & March, 1963: 279). Consequently, “slack provides a source of
funds for innovations that would not be approved in the face of scarcity but that
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have strong subunit support” (ibid.).
Additionally, experimental projects that would not be justified based on short-
term profit potential but that look promising in terms of long-term profit potential
can be accepted. Such an experiment or a search that is motivated and enabled by
organizational slack is termed “slack search” (Greve, 2003); these searches are
distinct from “problemistic search” in that the motivation for a slack search is not
associated with addressing a particular performance problem. Instead, slack searches
offer the potential to generate future alternatives that are not constrained by current
competitive requirements. Consequently, slack searches are expected to be more
intensive when more organizational slack is available.
Accordingly, innovations targeted at identifying or generating new knowledge
that is beyond the scope of current business (henceforth referred to as exploratory
innovation) increase to the extent that organizational slack increases.
IV. Contingency 2: Absorbed Slack and Unabsorbed Slack
In the foregoing discussion, we discuss the distinction between exploitative
innovation and exploratory innovation. However, our argument also suggests that
these alternative types of innovation are associated with distinct types of
organizational slack. Alternative types of organizational slack differ in the extent
that organizations are selective in their choice of legitimate slack usage. Here, we
are particularly concerned about the distinction between absorbed slack and
unabsorbed slack (Singh, 1986).
Absorbed slack is organizational slack that is distributed to particular usage, or
“absorbed into the system design as excess costs” (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983: 43).
Put differently, organizations are relatively selective in their choice of absorbed
slack usage, or are constrained. Examples of absorbed slack include excess
inventory, excess machine capacity, and indirect staff. Absorbed slack is nearly the
same as recoverable slack (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983), or low-discretion slack
(Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988).
On the other hand, unabsorbed slack is an alternative type of organizational
slack in which there are excess, liquid, and uncommitted resources in an
organization. Unabsorbed slack is also more readily redeployable because it is not
assigned to any particular usages (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Singh, 1986).
Therefore, organizations are less selective in their choice of unabsorbed slack
usages. The best examples of unabsorbed slack are cash and marketable securities.
Scholars also use available slack (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983), or high-discretion
slack (Sharfman et al., 1988) to denote unabsorbed slack. While potential slack
(Bromiley, 1991; O’Brien, 2003; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996) is also a type of
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undistributed organizational slack, we exclude it from our consideration because it
seems unrealistic to finance innovation by increasing debt.
1. Absorbed Slack and Exploitative Innovation
A straightforward extension of the comparative argument above, on alternative
types of organizational slack, allows us to argue that the type of organizational slack
most closely associated with exploitative innovation is absorbed slack. We make this
argument because problemistic searches, or the precursors to exploitative
innovations, are characterized as local searches (Stuart & Podolny, 1996) “in the
neighborhood of the problem symptom,” as well as “in the neighborhood of the
current alternative” (Cyert & March, 1963: 121).
Such local searches are conducted most effectively by those who experience
the performance problem most directly (Cyert & March, 1963: 122). For example,
the problem of failing to meet sales targets would be most effectively addressed by
the sales department, whereas failing to achieve yield targets would be most
effectively addressed by the manufacturing department.
It is quite natural to assume that those who experience performance problems
most directly will try to address their problems with the resources within their
discretion, or with absorbed slack. Therefore, we argue that the degree of available
absorbed slack is negatively associated with focal slack owners’ efforts to address
attainment discrepancies by way of exploitative innovation.
Several empirical studies show that organizations with more absorbed slack are
less willing to assume risks associated with innovation. For example, “managers
from firms with low levels of recoverable slack placed less weight on perceived
threats when making governance mode decisions than managers from organizations
with high levels of recoverable slack” (Steensma & Corley, 2001: 287). Such a low
tolerance for risk taking may be a consequence of internally oriented resource
allocation patterns associated with recoverable slack (Cheng & Kesner, 1997). In
fact, some argue that internally orientated allocation patterns result in managerial
perquisites. For example, increases in recoverable slack are negatively associated
with political behavior among top management teams, while increases in available
slack are irrelevant (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983). These findings indicate that
increases in recoverable slack are spent as perquisites to resolve conflicts among
managerial coalitions rather than as investments in organizational competitiveness.
In fact, Wiseman and Catanach (1997: 804) characterize recoverable slack as being
“closest to reflecting the concept of ‘X-efficiency’,” which is the discrepancy
between current and maximum output given current resources (Leibenstein, 1969).
Therefore, we offer our first proposition on the relationship between absorbed
slack and exploitative innovation.
Organizational Slack, Structure, and Learning ８９
Proposition 1. Absorbed slack is negatively associated with exploitative
innovation.
2. Unabsorbed Slack and Exploratory Innovation
While problemistic searches are concerned about current performance shortfall,
slack searches (Greve, 2003) aim for innovations that satisfy curiosity and further
understanding (Cyert & March, 1963). Therefore, slack searches are hardly
legitimatized by short-term profit opportunities. However, alternative usages of
organizational slack are closely scrutinized as to the extent that the slack is
explicitly distributed (and thus absorbed) to particular usages. Because of this
scrutinizing, some authors contend it is “unlikely that committed resources can be
converted easily into uncommitted resources in a manner that spurs organizational
innovation” (Mone, McKinley, & Barker, 1998: 123), implying that unabsorbed
slack enables slack searches more effectively than absorbed slack does.
Put differently, absorbed slack is too constrained in its possible usages to
enable slack searches, while unabsorbed slack encourages flexible searches for new
ideas and knowledge that may not be useful for addressing current business
requirements. Because unabsorbed slack can be transformed to absorbed slack at any
time, unabsorbed slack also allows organizations to be less responsive to
competitive requirements (Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991). However, when
firms with unabsorbed slack choose to respond to competitive requirements, the
amount of unabsorbed slack is negatively associated with the likelihood of
competitive response imitation (ibid.). Smith et al. (1991)’s findings indicate that
unabsorbed slack enables organizations to search for non-local knowledge when
trying to innovate a variety of response options, including entirely new actions.
With unabsorbed slack, organizations insulate themselves from short-term
competitive requirements so that they can innovate to radically revise their
“technical core” (Thompson, 1967), whereas absorbed slack insulates organizations
and allows dismissal of the urgency of incremental adjustments, preserving their
“technical core.” The finding that unabsorbed slack is more likely to be accumulated
by organizations that adopt externally oriented resource allocation patterns (Cheng
& Kesner, 1997) also supports our argument that unabsorbed slack enables
organizations to search distant domains.
Therefore, we offer a following proposition on the relationship between
unabsorbed slack and exploratory innovation.
Proposition 2. Unabsorbed slack is positively associated with exploratory
innovation.
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V. Contingency 3: Agency Costs
Although theoretical understanding on differences between absorbed and
unabsorbed slack is still limited (Singh, 1986; Wiseman & Catanach, 1997), agency
theory represents a promising theoretical perspective with which to evaluate how
absorbed slack and unabsorbed slack differ in terms of their influences on
managerial risk taking, and thus on subsequent innovation. In the foregoing
discussion, we differentiate between absorbed slack and unabsorbed slack by
considering internal conflicts among managerial coalitions over the discretionary use
of organizational slack. However, we argue that absorbed slack and unabsorbed
slack also differ in terms of the degree that managers versus shareholders have
external conflicts regarding risk taking.
Compared to shareholders, managers are less willing to pursue risk-seeking
initiatives because managers’ well-being is closely tied to the fate of their
organizations (Fama, 1980). If the failure of high-risk initiatives negatively
influences organizational performance, managers may be forced to accept pay cuts,
to witness damage to their reputations, or even to lose their jobs. Consequently,
managers generally prefer low-risk initiatives over high-risk initiatives (Baysinger,
Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Francis & Smith, 1995; Hill & Snell, 1989). In contrast,
shareholders expect managers to increase risk taking because higher risk is
associated with higher expected financial return. Unlike managers, shareholders are
not concerned about the potential downsides of higher risk, because shareholders
can reduce their exposure to financial risks by diversifying their investments (Fama,
1980).
We argue that such conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders are
particularly relevant to the usage of absorbed slack, as monitoring the usage of
absorbed slack is more difficult than monitoring the usage of unabsorbed slack.
First, it is very difficult for external stakeholders to identify excess costs. In
fact, it is difficult for even managers to precisely identify excess portions of total
costs. On the other hand, it is relatively easy to identify unabsorbed slack. For
example, marketable securities, a typical example of unabsorbed slack, are self-
explicit. Second, absorbed slack often represents perquisites for managers, which
may be a necessity for managers but is a waste for shareholders. Third, quantifying
returns from absorbed slack is very difficult, whereas returns from unabsorbed slack
can be quantified relatively easily. These characteristics of absorbed slack pose
substantial challenges for shareholders trying to monitor slack. In contrast, as long
as unabsorbed slack remains unabsorbed, identifying infringements on shareholder
interests is quite difficult because the existence of unabsorbed slack per se does not
particularly erode shareholders’ interests (although opportunity costs may incur).
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The inappropriate usage of unabsorbed slack (i.e., distributing unabsorbed slack to
certain usages, including absorbed slack) is what may substantially harm
shareholders.
Therefore, we argue that managers avoid risk taking to the extent that
monitoring by shareholders is difficult, or that more absorbed slack is available. Put
differently, absorbed slack allows managers to avoid risk taking to the extent that
shareholders experience difficulty in monitoring usages of absorbed slack. Further,
the difficulty of monitoring absorbed slack’s usage increases as available absorbed
slack increases (Jensen, 1986; Kim et al., 2008). Organizational slack intensifies the
agency problem because monitoring organizational slack is difficult to the extent
that more slack resource is available for discretionary usages by managers.
1. Absorbed Slack and Exploratory Innovation
Building on the discussion above, we argue that the relationship between
absorbed slack and exploratory innovation is predominantly positive, concave
downward－the relationship shows the combination of the overall positive trend and
the increasingly negative influences of managerial risk avoidance.
In the previous section, we argue that exploratory innovation is most effectively
enabled by unabsorbed slack, but this does not necessarily mean that absorbed slack
precludes exploratory innovation. Although the usage of absorbed slack is more
constrained to specific purposes than unabsorbed slack is, absorbed slack may still
allow managers to exercise discretion (limitedly). For example, a manufacturing
manager may explore a radically new design for raw materials processing with his
or her discretionary budget. In short, absorbed slack may also be associated with
positive influences on exploratory innovation, but these positive influences are
substantially weaker than unabsorbed slack’s influences.
Further, this overall positive trend is under the increasingly negative influences
of managerial risk avoidance that are associated with increases in absorbed slack.
Particularly in the case of exploratory innovation, managers’ interests and
shareholders’ interests are poorly aligned because exploratory innovation entails
higher risk than exploitative innovation. Accordingly, the more the absorbed slack
that is available, the more managers are reluctant to bear the risks associated with
exploratory innovation.
Therefore, we argue that the relationship between absorbed slack and
exploratory innovation is obtained by combining the negative influences of
managers’ risk avoidance with the positive influences of managerial discretion. We
expect that the net results of these offsetting effects is shown by a predominantly
positive, concave-downward curve, because the marginal increase in exploratory
innovation diminishes as managers grow more risk avoidant as the amount of
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Proposition 3. There is a predominantly positive, concave-downward
relationship between absorbed slack and exploratory innovation.
2. Unabsorbed Slack and Exploitative Innovation
We follow a similar argument to develop our forth proposition on the
relationship between unabsorbed slack and exploitative innovation. Specifically,
unabsorbed slack buffers organizations from competitive requirements, albeit less
effectively than absorbed slack does, because unabsorbed slack may not necessarily
be used to address attainment discrepancy as was discussed above. Accordingly, we
argue that there is a negative relationship between unabsorbed slack and exploitative
innovation, but the relationship is less explicit than in the case of the negative
relationship between absorbed slack and exploitative innovation.
As for unabsorbed slack’s effects on allowing managers to avoid risks, we
argue that the influence of more effective monitoring by shareholders, which is
associated with unabsorbed slack, is marginal because exploitative innovation may
not be closely associated with risk taking. Consequently, the positive effects
associated with more effective shareholder monitoring would not be strong enough
to offset negative effects of buffering.
Therefore, we argue that the relationship between unabsorbed slack and
exploitative innovation is marginally negative. Our final proposition is stated as
follows.
Proposition 4. Unabsorbed slack is associated with exploitative innovation
in a marginally negative manner.
VI. Discussion
In this concluding section, we discuss our contributions. First, we have
reconciled mutually contradictory prior findings on organizational slack by
proposing a contingency perspective on the relationship between organizational
slack and innovation.
Building upon prior research on organizational slack, organizational searches,
innovation, and agency costs, we suggest that it may not be accurate to argue that
organizational slack directly encourages or discourages particular behaviors.
Alternatively, we argue that contextual characteristics－including search modes, an
organization’s degree of selectiveness in its choice of legitimate slack usages, and
the extent to which effective shareholder monitoring is ensured－condition how
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certain types of innovation are encouraged. These contextual characteristics are
closely associated with particular types of organizational slack, which determines the
relationship between alternative types of organizational slack and innovation.
Accordingly, our argument reconciles the arguments of prior works that suggest a
direct (either positive or negative) relationship exists between organizational slack
and innovation and the arguments of more recent works that suggest that
organizational slack has a moderating effect.
The proposed contingency perspective allows us to argue for differential
influences of organizational slack on innovation, by taking into account the
asymmetry of organizational slack’s buffering effects. Organizational slack buffers
organizations from environmental changes, which then influences exploitative
innovation and exploratory innovation differentially. Buffered organizations are less
likely to try to improve performance by way of exploitative innovation. However,
the same buffer provides organizations the flexibility for managers to shift their
attentions from current viability toward future viability (Levinthal & March, 1993).
Put differently, organizational slack adjusts the balance between managers’ short-
term perspective and long-term perspective. The arguments by agency-theory
scholars and organization-theory scholars are not mutually contradictory but are
concerned with different but related ideas (Tan & Peng, 2003). Accordingly, our
contingency perspective also reconciles “slack-as-resources-for-change and slack-as-
a-buffer arguments” (Cheng & Kesner, 1997: 5).
Additionally, our argument reconciles the competing perspectives on
organizational slack given by behavioral theory and agency theory. Organizational
scholars argue for a positive relationship between organizational slack and
innovation, while agency-theory scholars argue for a negative relationship. Neither
theory is without its drawbacks; behavioral theory focuses on only internal conflicts
among managerial coalitions, while agency theory excessively simplifies by
neglecting internal conflicts in order to focus on external conflicts between
managers and shareholders. As we have shown above, agency theory complements
behavioral theory because the former describes one aspect of managerial behaviors.
In reality, organizations suffer some mixture of both internal and external conflicts,
which inevitably influences the relationship between organizational slack and
innovation.
Given that alternative types of organizational slack are associated with different
degrees of agency costs, several measures to reduce agency costs－including
managerial stock holding (Agrawal & Gershon, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Walkling & Long, 1984) and stock concentration (Baysinger et al.,
1991; Francis & Smith, 1995; Hill & Snell, 1989)－may moderate the relationship
between organizational slack and innovation by reducing differences between
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absorbed slack’s and unabsorbed slack’s influences on innovation. This topic may
provide an interesting direction for future research.
Another straightforward avenue to extend our argument would be to examine
the relationship between organizational slack and risk taking. By differentiating the
degree of risks involved, it is expected that we would gain consistent findings on
the relationship between slack and risk taking. On the other hand, the relationship
between slack and organizational performance requires more careful consideration;
whether exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation enable favorable
performance depends on a wide variety of contextual characteristics, including
environmental dynamics, competitive intensity, and organizational size.
Finally, our argument theorizes about the differences between absorbed slack
and unabsorbed slack by taking account the differential degree of difficulties
associated with monitoring by shareholders. Although prior research shows that
“unabsorbed slack plays a role different from absorbed slack in risk taking” (Singh,
1986: 580), “there is no theoretical foundation for distinguishing between them or
their effects on risk” (Wiseman & Catanach, 1997: 804). For example, some
research indicates that the effects of high-discretion slack (unabsorbed slack) are
more insightfully explained by organization theory, whereas the observed effects of
low-discretion slack (absorbed slack) more strongly support agency theory (George,
2005; Tan & Peng, 2003), but “an a priori theory about the differential effects of
the two slack components is lacking” (Singh, 1986: 567).
We argue that absorbed slack is associated with more substantial monitoring
challenges for shareholders than unabsorbed slack is. This argument is a
straightforward extension of the differences between slack in terms of associated
managerial discretion. Monitoring appropriate usages of organizational slack is
challenging for external stakeholders (including shareholders) to the extent that
constraints placed on the usage of organizational slack is idiosyncratic to
organizational contexts. Without understanding such idiosyncratic contexts, it is very
difficult to judge whether focal slack is appropriately used or not. Monitoring the
usages of absorbed slack is more challenging for shareholders to the extent that
absorbed slack is distributed to particular idiosyncratic usages, while unabsorbed
slack is not constrained by such idiosyncrasy. Differentiating between absorbed
slack and unabsorbed slack is theoretically meaningful because unabsorbed slack
can be converted to absorbed slack relatively easily, but this change is essentially
irreversible. Such differences are also important because organizations’ efforts on
innovation can be maintained to the extent that effective shareholder monitoring is
ensured.
It seems to be very difficult to identify organizations with no organizational
slack. Further, organizational slack influences various aspects of organizational
Organizational Slack, Structure, and Learning ９５
phenomena, including coalition building (Cyert & March, 1963), political behaviors
(Bourgeois & Singh, 1983), risk taking (Bromiley, 1991; Singh, 1986), competitive
responses (Smith et al., 1991; Thompson, 1967), and profitability (George, 2005;
Tan & Peng, 2003; Wang, Sun, Yu, & Zhang, 2013). However, understating of
organizational slack is still limited, fragmented, and confused. We hope our
arguments stimulate further discussion on this interesting construct.
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